I Am 100% Certain That Phil Stilwell Promotes Irrationality

(Formerly: Does Phil Stilwell Promote Irrationality?)

P1 Any source that promotes binary and absolute belief/disbelief for human epistemic agents is promoting irrationality [Phil Stilwell, bold mine]

P2 Phil Stilwell promotes binary and absolute disbelief for human epistemic agents: “If you argue that the square triangle in your pocket is made of gold, and produce genuine gold flakes as evidence, we still know with absolute certainty that you do not have a golden square triangle in your pocket.” [Phil Stilwell, bold mine]

C Phil Stilwell promotes irrationality

It seems to me his only out would be to argue that the proposition, “you do not have a golden square triangle in your pocket” is tautological. Of course, this assumes Phil merely forgot to add the qualifier “in a non-tautological proposition” to P1 [which is really P5 as delineated here].

What sayest thou?

Phil’s Failure: Responding To Faith’s Failure, 2.0

So, right about here, atheist agnostic blogger Phil Stilwell popped up and claimed that “Christianity refutes Christianity,” offering, among others, the following argument:

P1 Jesus considered those who believe with less confirmatory evidence more blessed that those who believed with more evidence. (John 20:19-31)

P2 Falsehoods are more likely to have less confirmatory evidence at their disposal than have truths.

P3 Those who believe with less confirmatory evidence are more likely to believe falsehoods.

C Jesus considered those who are more likely to believe falsehoods more blessed. (P1 – P3)

My initial response was that P2 is mere assertion. Phil asked me to state what I believe about evidence and justification, and I answered. I later explained that even if I accept P2 for the sake of argument, Phil’s syllogism remains unsound on account of P1. In between his insults, Phil kept asking me to repeat myself, which I did here, here, here, and here. Now, Phil’s offered a new argument, and I’d like to address it separately from Faith’s Failure 1.0, which–I believe–we are still discussing.

Read More →

Is Desirism An Objective Moral Theory?

Luke Muehlhauser claims that desirism is an objective moral theory. I think it’s quite easy to demonstrate that this is an incoherent claim. Recall that Luke defines “objective moral value” thus:

…usually, the phrase “OBJECTIVE moral value” means something like “moral value grounded in something beyond the attitudes of a person or persons.” Right? If what you’re calling “moral value” is just based off somebody’s personal attitudes, that’s called SUBJECTIVE morality. [source]

Read More →

The Argument From Justice

P1    Systems that are amenable to justice are superior to those that are not;

P2    Atheism is not amenable to justice;

P3    Christianity is amenable to justice;

C      Christianity is superior to atheism.

The Argument From Probability

P1  Cessation of consciousness upon death entails zero ontological possibilities;

P2  Continuation of consciousness after death entails several ontological possibilities;

C    Continuation of consciousness after death has a higher chance of ontological actuality than cessation of consciousness upon death.

Argument From The Superiority Of Knowable Claims

P1  In matters of logic and empiricism, knowable claims are veridically superior to unknowable claims;

P2  The claim that consciousness continues at some point after physical death is knowable;

P3  The claim that consciousness ceases upon death is unknowable;

C    The claim that consciousness continues at some point after physical death is veridically superior to the claim that consciousness ceases upon death.

The Argument From Computer Programming

P1   Conscious entities are currently the only entities we know of that can write a series of intelligent statements in a specific language;

P2   Human DNA contains a series of intelligent statements written in a specific language;

P3   A conscious entity is currently the only entity we know of that could have possibly created humans.