May 18, 2012
So Greta Christina wrote this reaaaaallllly loooonnnng slog which can basically be expressed in the following sentence: in the marketplace of ideas, why should religion be immune from criticism?
My answer? It shouldn’t. Religion can and should be criticized like any other idea, and in my opinion, the religious should welcome this criticism. After all, I welcome criticism, because through criticism my beliefs are tested. If—like JT Eberhard—I were to shy away from criticism, then I would lose out on the opportunity to test my beliefs. If I lose out on that opportunity, I increase my chance of holding false beliefs. Therefore, criticism of religion is as essential as criticism of any other idea with far-ranging social implications.
So there you go, Greta. Your second straight answer.
April 10, 2012
If you haven’t read it already, I highly suggest Neil Postman’s The End of Education. It isn’t about (a)theism per se—it’s actually about how the transcendent, unifying narratives of previous generations have been replaced by “gods” of consumerism, technology and economic utility—but Postman raises many points with direct import to (a)theist debate. For example,
…the Big Bang theory of modern astronomers is not so far from the story of the Beginning as found Genesis. The thought that a group of camel-riding Bedouins huddling around a fire in the desert night four thousand years ago might ponder the question of how the universe began and come up with a narrative that is similar to one accepted by MIT professors in the late twentieth century speaks of a continuity of human imagination that cannot fail to inspire. (p.112-113)
But of course, as most of the enlightened, rational atheists already know, there is no evidence for God. They may as well discard Postman’s candor entirely.
September 2, 2011
I’ve noticed this thing where uber-rational people judge others as “irrational” based exclusively on whether or not the belief in question has **unassailable scientific evidence. When the uber-rationalist makes that move, they misapply a legitimate but isolated truth-criterion without consideration for the full context in which the “irrational” person holds their belief. I say “misapply” because I generally disfavor a myopic approach to reality and I believe truth is best demonstrated through multiple criteria.
August 23, 2011
So you might have heard that the Loftus put out a new book pompously titled, The End of Christianity, which includes a chapter from self-proclaimed infidel Richard Carrier, titled, Moral Facts Naturally Exist (and Science Could Find Them). Can we agree that this is an empirical claim? If so, can you imagine the consternation that might ensue if a reputable physics journal published a paper titled: The Higgs Boson Exists, And Science Could Find It?
August 20, 2011
In a recent discussion over at SoulSprawl, I encountered the following remark:
…solipsism is meaningless, not false, because there is no difference that we can know of, even in principle, that would tell apart a solipsist from a non-solipsist world.
The same goes for the doctrine of physicalism. To date, all definitions of physicalism I’ve seen lead to meaningless philosophical gibberish. There is nothing, even in principle, that could reliably differentiate between a physical and non-physical cause. If you agree, please affirm. If you disagree, state a precise definition of physicalism and we’ll go from there.
August 11, 2011
This, more or less, is what I tend to believe about morality:
Take, for example, that which we are now doing, drinking, singing and talking—these actions are not in themselves either good or evil, but they turn out in this or that way according to the mode of performing them; and when well done they are good, and when wrongly done they are evil; and in like manner not every love, but only that which has a noble purpose, is noble and worthy of praise.
-From Plato’s Symposium
What sayest thou?
July 22, 2011
Would you accept the presence of evil as evidence of an evil, but not necessarily omnipotent god? Why or why not?
July 21, 2011
C.S. Lewis concisely and eloquently explains the folly of drawing conclusions from so-called “scientific” prayer studies:
The question then arises, “What sort of evidence would prove the efficacy of prayer?” The thing we pray for may happen, but how can you ever know it was not going to happen anyway? Even if the thing were indisputably miraculous it would not follow that the miracle had occurred because of your prayers. The answer surely is that a compulsive empirical Proof such as we have in the sciences can never be attained. Some things are proved by the unbroken uniformity of our experiences. The law of gravitation is established by the fact that, in our experience, all bodies without exception obey it. Now even if all the things that people prayed for happened, which they do not, this would not prove what Christians mean by the efficacy of prayer. For prayer is request. The essence of request, as distinct from compulsion, is that it may or may not be granted. And if an infinitely wise Being listens to the requests of finite and foolish creatures, of course He will sometimes grant and sometimes refuse them. Invariable “success” in prayer would not prove the Christian doctrine at all. It would prove something much more like magic — a power in certain human beings to control, or compel, the course of nature.
So brilliant, so timeless.
So I’ve been cleaning out my notes, and I came across the following accusation from somebody calling themselves Hermes:
Why spend time on a detailed and thoughtful response when the other person is unwilling and also unable to comprehend or even attempt to engage what you have said?
Of course, the implication is that I am unwilling and unable to engage Hermes’ points, but you can find evidence to the contrary, here. As JS Allen also points out, Hermes was directing all sorts of believers to this thread and challenging them to respond to the points, yet, Hermes seems to have disappeared, and it’s been over a year now. So who is unwilling and unable to engage what’s been said?
July 20, 2011
Though occasional use is inevitable, I generally try to avoid the words proof and disproof, especially in discussions of epistemology and empiricism. I don’t know how many of you have met him yet, but Peter Hurford is a new commenter around here with a blog of his own, and from what I’ve seen so far, I would highly recommend dialoging with him on behalf of his aptitude and courtesy. He also asks good questions, the kind that get you thinking, as opposed to, say, the kind that piss you off. Recently on another blog, Peter made a remark that I felt compelled to reply to, and I wanted to repost a slight modification of that short reply here, just to see what people here might think of it.
